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The Mwea - Tebere Irrigation Scheme and 
Rice Marketing in Kenya 
The development of the Mwea - Tebere Irrigation Scheme 
over the last decade has had a marked effect on all aspects of 
the Kenyan rice economy. • Although the Scheme is judged an 
many grounds to be a success/ especially in terms of achieving 
a high net income for approximately 1,800 tenant farmers, it is 
doubtful whether the general Kenyan population has gained much 
benefit from the scheme, especially that sector of the population 
which has traditionally regarded rice as one of their staple foods. 
Indeed this scheme must be classified with so many other agricul-
tural development plans in being production - orientated rather 
than market - orientated. 
The three major faults of the marketing system have been 
the lack of any positive attempts to expand the market for rice, 
especially amongst African consumers, second the continuance of 
a cost - plus pricing system with no control over costs in the 
interest of the consumer, and third, the use of the marketing 
system as a source of finance not only by the National Irrigation 
Board but also by the Maize and Produce Board. The reasons for 
saying this are outlined in the following pages, together with 
recommendations for improving the situation in the future. 
First however, it is necessary to describe the recent history of 
rice paddy production and the pattern of trade in rice in Kenya. 
The traditional areas of paddy production in Kenya before 
the Mwea - Tebere irrigation scheme came into large scale 
operation were, to a great extent, confined to the periphery of 
the country. To the west in Nyanza Province, rain-grown paddy 
was produced on the land lying close to Lake Victoria? and on the 
coast there was an irrigation scheme at Vanga, together with 
production of rain-grown paddy mainly from Tana River District,, 
Central Province in which the Mwea-Tebere scheme is situated, 
also produced some rain-grown paddy but considerably less than 
the other two areas. For example, in 1957/58before Mwea-Tebere 
had begun to market paddy in- quantity, Nyanza Province marketed 
4085 tons of paddy, the Coast Province 1460 tons, while the 
Central Province marketed only 400 tons. 
This pattern of production changed rapidly with the increase 
in paddy production from Mwea-Tebere which reached 5849"tons in 
1960, 11853 tons in 1963 and 13635 tons in 1967. By this time 
Nyanza Province production had decreased to 1368 tons although, 
the production of rain-grown paddy there was expected to incru^!: 
in the following year (1968), while in 1967 the Coast Province 
production of paddy had reached negligible proportions, there 
being only 2 tons marketed in that year. The causes of this 
decline in the Coast region were the collapse of the ~vanga 
irrigation scheme in the early 1960's, together with transport 
problems created by the Somali shifta. In the Nyanza Province 
it has been suggested that there may be three reasons for declinin 
production; namely a general decline in rice paddy husbandry 
standards together with the relatively attractive producer price 
for maize and sugar, and more conjecturally, the rising level of 
Lake Victoria reducing the areas suitable for paddy production. 
The location of rice mills in Kenya logically followed the 
former pattern of production because until 1961/2, when two mills 
were installed in Nairobi and Thika (some 30 miles from Nairobi) 
undoubtedly under the influence of the increasing production of 
the Mwea-Tebere scheme, the milling capacity of the country was 
represented by effectively 5 mills; three on the coast and two 
in Nyanza province. 
The change in the pattern of production which began in the 
early 1960's, has .meant that the coastal mills have had to rely 
to an increasing extent on Mwea paddy and the somewhat erratic 
imports from Tanzania (obviously rice from overseas is imported 
as milled rice and not as paddy). The Nyanza mills have been face 
with decreasing supplies of paddy from local producers. However, 
production of paddy in Nyanza is likely to increase in the next 
few years with the launching of irrigation projects at Ahero and 
Yala Swamp, 
Superimposed on this picture of a declining production from 
traditional paddy producing areas with its replacement, by paddy 
from Mwea-Tebere, has been the opening of the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd. 
at Wanguru on the irrigation scheme itself in early 1968. 
Following the opening of the Mwea mill, the Coast mills no 
longer receive paddy from Mwea, which is probably economically 
justified because of transport costs. The comparatively new mills 
at Thika and Nairobi will receive the former coastal allocation 
temporarily but by the early 1970's, it is envisaged that the 
single mill at Mwea will be capable of handling the irrigation 
scheme's entire paddy output which by them will exceed 20,000 tons 
per annum. 
Thus within a little more than a decade, the structure of 
the rice economy in Kenya has changed from one of many individuals 
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producing mainly rain-grown paddy for processing at five and 
subsequently seven mills, to one where the bulk of the crop 
is produced and .'processed in one single area* This t 
transformation in the physical structure of the industry is 
likely to have far reaching effects on its costs structure and 
this will be examined later. 
During the last decade when the influence on the Kenyan rice 
market of rice produced at Mwea-Tebere has been increasingly felt, 
the most important single factor which stands out has been the 
decline in the quantities of rice imported into the country from 
overseas. Thus whereas the average annual imports of rice over 
the three year period 1957-1959 was 8208 tons, the average amount 
imported annually during the three year- period 1965-1967 was only 
2375 tons. 
Since 1959 at least, imports of rice into Kenya have been 
subject to import licencing, and since 1963 the Kenya ¥atioml.$rading 
Corporation has been the sole importer. Up to 1960 Siam was 
the main source of rice imports for Kenya, but in 1961 there was 
a sudden change and Pakistan became the main supplier. The size 
of the annual import quota has been decided by the Ministry of 
Commerce in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
the Ei„in policy consideration appears to have been to keep total 
available supplies relatively constant. As there is no control 
of interterritorial transfers of rice and rice paddy between the 
three East African countries, this policy of stabilising supplies 
has only been moderately successful. 
Kenya's exports of rice in the past naturally have been 
negligible being largely confined to the ships® chandling trade 
at Mombasa. However, transfers out of Kenya to other East 
African territories, notably Uganda, have been considerable in 
some years. This trade decreased very significantly during the 
drought years of 1965 and 1966 but 1967 saw these transfers 
approach their former level. 
Thus over the past decade Kenya has steadily decreased her 
inports of rice. This should be welcomed in terms of achieving 
import substitution, -but it has apparently had repercussions on 
rice consumption by the Asian population in Kenya. 
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The Consumption of Rice in Kenya 
Owing to the paucity of food consumption data in Kenya an 
indirect approach to studying consumption patterns of rice has 
had to be used. The main problem lies in trying to isolate the 
consumption trends' displayed by the Asian and African racial groups 
from the Arabs and Europeans and to examine each separately| the 
Asians who traditionally are the largest consumers of rice, and 
the Africans who are not likely to be eating much rice as 
individuals but as a group are likely to be consuming a significant 
amount, A report of the FAO"'" has shown that in the late 1950:s 
early 1960®s the average annual per caput consumption of rice in 
Europe was about 8.8 lbs and in the Arabian penisular about 26.4 lbsc 
As there is no better data these levels have been used to indicate 
the European and Arab rice consumption in Kenya on the admittedly 
over-simple assumption that it did not vary between years. This 
is because rice provides a relatively small proportion of total 
cereal consumption and therefore changes in the price of rice 
would not significantly affect the level of consumption by these 
racial groups. 
There are only very few clues available to indicate the 
likely level of consumption of rice by the African population. 
A survey of Africans living in Nairobi and earning about £130 
per annum was carried out in 1957/58 and revealed that the average 
monthly expenditure on rice was shs. 1.97 which represented 1,9$ (-f 
2 
food expenditure or 1.1% of total expenditure. In another 
consumer survey carried out in 1963"^ , an expenditure of sis. 5.60 
per month on rice is quoted which represented about 1,0$ of 
total expenditure of African consumers earning an average of 
£400 per annum. These two surveys were undertaken in one urban 
area only - Nairobi - and the information on rural consumers is 
even more slender. This amount to a household survey which 
took place over the one year period from mid-February 1963 in 4 
Central ProvinceT. • I-Iere it was estimated that expenditure on 
cereals accounted for 11,2$ of total expenditure and of this, 
5$ was on rice. It is not known whether this was an arbitrary 
assessment of the expenditure on rice 'but if it is correct', then 
even these relatively affluent rural consumers, only allocated 
about fo of their t-otal expenditure on rice. This is to be 
exp'ected because not only is rice a relatively, expensive cereal 
food but also it is- not likely to be widely available in rUral 
areas outside the rice producing districts. 
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Therefore, for the purposes of this exercise, it was decided to 
ignore the rural African consumer of rice and use the above 
estimates of consumption of rice by African wage earners in 
Nairobi to indicate the possible level of rice consumption by 
Africans in the 7 largest urban areas in Kenya. Thus the annual 5 . 
wage bill or these areas was obtained, a somewhat arbitrary 15p 
was deducted to allow for taxes and insurance payments and ifi was 
taken of the remainder as an estimate of the actual total 
expenditure on rice. These annual expenditures were then divided 
by the average annual retail price of local rice to give the 
estimates of the quantity of rice annually consumed. The apparent 
rate of growth in consumption by urban Africans over this period 
is"'probably realistic. Over the period 1962-67 the urban 
population of Africans grew by 30 per cent, so that if the estimated 
African consumption of rice of 3.091 m.lb in 1962 was equivalent 
to 4.71b per head, and the total African consumption of 7.057m.lb 
in 1967 was equivalent to consumption of ,8.41b per head, that is 
an increase of almost 80 per cent in per caput consumption. Nor.1 
urban incomes have increased by 86 per cent per head over this 
same period, yielding an income elasticity of 0.93 which compares 
very favourably with the Massell/Heyer estimates of elasticity 
of demand for rice with respect to total expenditure of between 
0.7 and 1.0. 
These estimates of the annual total consumption of ri^e 
by the African, European and Arab racial groups were deducted from 
the estimates of the qnnual available supplies of rice (Table l) 
and the residual were assumed to have been consumed by the Asian 
community. These annual estimates are shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2: Estimates of Rice Consumption Kenya, 1958 to 1967 p , 
Year European Arab African Total „Residual Asian Asian 
Available"'" Popula- Consu-
tion mption 
lbs/hd, 
131.4 
133.3 
138.0 
109.7 
94.5 
101.8 
85.0 
82.9 
107.2 
90.9 
Notes 1. Allowifig^  of European rice consumption of 8.8 lbs/hd 
2. " » Arab " " "26.4 lbs/hd 
m.lbs m.lbs m.lbs m.lbs m.lbs m.lbs 000 
1958 0.519 0.845 2.410 24.935 21.161 161 
9 0.528 0.871 2.600 25.994 21.995 165 60 0,537 0.898 2.720 27.209 23.324, 169 1 0.519 0.898 2.960 23.358 18.981 173 2 0.493 0.898 3.091 21.107 16.625 176 
3 0.466 0.924 3.940 23.659 18.329 180 
4 0.431 0.950 5.539 22.479 15.559 183 
5 0.370 0.977 6.041 22.724 15.336 185 6 0.378 1.003 5.743 27.283 20.154 188 
7 0.370 1.030 7.057 25.907 17.450 192 
(Source: FAO, 1963, The World Rice Economy, Vol. 11) 
3. Based on 1 fo of total expenditure being spent on rice. 
Derived from African urban wage bill for main urban 
areas. Sourcet Statistical Abstracts, MEPD, 1958 to 
1967. 
4. Using a two year rolling average of domestic productio 
imports ana transfers into Kenya, net of exports and 
transfers out of Kenya. 
Although this method is admittedly very crude and the 
evidence on which it is based is slender in-the extreme, 
nevertheless it does yield results which are plausible and 
instructive. Thus it is found that the level of per caput 
consumption by Asians in Kenya in the late 1950's is about 15-20 
lbs less than the FAO estimate for India in the same period'', 
namely 150 lbs. As rice consumption varies markedly in different 
parts of India, and as the majority of Kenyan Asians oiiginate 
from Southern India where rice consumption is below average this 
figure seems to be reasonably realistic. However, the most 
striking result to emerge from this analysis is that since that 
time the per capita consumption of rice by the Asian community 
in Kenya has fallen markedly. 
Simple economic theory suggests that there may be thro 
reasons to explain this decline in rice consumption by the averag 
Asian consumer. They are (1).changing price relationships 
between•substitutable cereals, (2) the effect of increasing per 
caput income during the period and (3) their tastes and preferonc 
for different types of rice. Each of these will be examined 
briefly -in turn. 
The first postulate requires that the retail price of 
rice has increased relative to other cereals during the past 
decade so that Asian consumers have been rationally substituting 
other cereals for rice5 in this case wheat either as bread or as 
flour for the making of chapatis. It would seem that the 
average weighted price of rice has not increased relative to that 
of wheat except in the exceptional period of drought and its 
consequences in 1965 to 196b. Rather, during the period when the 
consumption of rice by the Asian population was decreasing most 
rapidly, 1961 to 1965, the weighted average retail price of rice 
was also falling. Certainly on this evidence price does not seem 
to be an,important factor in influencing the consumption of rice 
by Kenyan Asians. 
The second postulate requires that increases in the per 
capita income of the Asian community over the decade may have 
influenced the consumption of rice. In other words, Asians are 
eating less rice on average because their elasticity of demand 
for rice with respect to income or expenditure is negative and 
average incomes have been increasing. Now, the estimated per 
capita consumption of rice by Asians has fallen by about 45P 
between 1958 and 1967 while the estimated per capita incomes of 
Asian wage earners had increased by 351° during the period , this 
would imply that roughly the income elasticity of demand for rice 
is nearly - 1.6. According to FAO estimates , such a high negative 
income elasticity would not be expected. 
By a process of elimination it would appear that the third 
reason put forward for this changing pattern in rice consumption, 
the exercise by the consumer of his taste and preference, is the 
main one. Indeed, the evidence collected strongly supports this 
contention. The traditional rice consumer has a very decided 
preference for the type of rice he consumes. For example, the 
decline in the consumption of imported rice after 1960 may have 
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been caused by the substitution of Pakistani rice for Siamese." 
Although there is a surmised preference between types of imported 
rice, there is a more definite preference for imported rice over 
the locally produced article amounting to a decided antagonism 
towards locally produced rice because it produces an inferior 
cooked product unless cooking habits are suitably adapted. It 
seems that traditional rice eaters are not prepared to make this 
adaptation. Again, there is no doubt that local rice has been 
inferior to the imported article in terms of presentation. The 
quality of milling has been poor with samples frequently being 
dirty (much dust and other waste material) and having a high 
proportion of broken grains ('brokens'). As the first phase new-
mill at Mwea comes into full operation (11,500 tons of raw paddy 
processed to yield 7200 to 7600 tons of rice per annum) the effect 
on the average quality of locally produced rice should be 
significant. 
If Asian rice consumers are expressing an antagonism 
towards the local product, the fact that the proportion of 
domestic rice in the. total available supplies has been increasing-
over the past decade will account for the absolute decline in rice 
consumption. By combining the two known trends in the Kenyan rice 
economy during the past 10 years - the increasing importance of 
locally produced rice with rising domestic production and 
restrictions on imports, and the declining per caput rice 
consumption of the .Asian community..!- it would appear that the 
average Asian does not like local rice so that if imports are 
restricted he will eat less rice substituting other cereals, 
probably wheat. Now whether this trend in consumption is 
irreversible or whether a significant improvement in the quality 
of the local product will halt it, remains to, be seen. 
Of course, it could be arqued that the'residual' method 
used in estimating Asian consumption is bound to lead to a 
declining consumption by this sector and from the available empir 
evidence, one could equally well argued that the Asians have a 
stable consumption and that it is the other racial groups that 
have had a declining per caput consumption. There is, however, 
plenty of subjective evidence that Asians are refusing to consume 
much local rice,. Additionally, declining African consumption 
would be difficult to reconcile with the very high elasticities 
of demand for rice with respect to total expenditure quoted by 
Mas sell aid Heyer, 
In conclusion it could be fairly said that a purely 
passive policy has been adopted over the past decade with respect 
to rice consumption, the main objective being to maintain supplie 
at a relatively stable level. In doing this the Asian consumer ha 
been deprived of his customary source of rice, and more 
importantly, little attention has been paid to actively encoura-
ging the African population to consume rice. If, as most people 
suspect, the demand for rice by Africans is highly price elastic, 
then if had measures been taken to reduce the price of rice, the 
African could have enjoyed a much mere varied diet, the tenants 
of the Mwea - Tebere Irrigation scheme would have had a much 
greater market for their product, and there would have been less 
need to restrict those types of rice enjoyed by the Asian 
community. 
Given that the demand by Africans is likely to be 
extremely price elastic, it will instructive to consider how 
cheaply rice paddy could be marketed, milled distributed to 
consumers. This method can then be compared \:ith existing 
marketing system to illustrate why the present system, isiessentia 
a high cost one. Initially it will be useful to give; a brief 
outline of the present system for marketing paddy. 
In the space of a decade, the marketing of rice paddy fro 
the Mwea/Tebere Scheme has been handled by no less than four 
organisations namely the Maize and Produce Control (up to 1959)• 
the Central Province Marketing Board (1959-64), the Kenya 
- 10 -
Agricultural Produce Marketing Board (1964-66) and the Maize and 
Produce Board (1966 onwards). This is not a reflection of 
competition between Marketing Boards, but simply indicates the 
conflict in marketing philosophy in Kenya in recent years 
between a commodity, a regional or a national organisation of 
boards. 
Despite this continual change, the general pattern of 
paddy marketing (at least since 1960) has boon the same. (Diagram l) 
The Mwea Irrigation Scheme management have provided farmers with 
bags, receiving the paddy from farmers, weighing it and recording 
the moisture content, drying the paddy to a uniform moisture 
content of 14 per cent., rebagging the paddy in 160 lb. lots and 
calculating the amount to be paid to each tenant. • The Marketing-
Board has taken the paddy from the Scheme after it has been 
bagged and roweighed and has boon responsible for transporting it 
to stores and storing it until purchased by the mills. 
DIAGRAM 1; Ownership of Rice Paddy 
Tenants of Mwoa/Tebere 
Irrigation Scheme. 
Mwea Irrigation Scheme 
acting as agents for the 
Maize and Produce Board. 
1 
Maize and Produce Board. 
1 Mwea Rice Mill Ltd. 
All Other Producers 
Maize and Produce Board 
agents. 
Maize and Produce Board 
I 
Mills at Thika and Nairobi 
The Maize and Produce Board pay the Mwea Irrigation 
Scheme management (National Irrigation Board) monthly for dried 
and bagged paddy received at the reception centres. Starting 
with the 1962/3 harvest the Scheme have paid an advance to the 
tenant of 10s. per 1801b. bag of paddy on delivery at the 
reception centres to encourage rapid harvesting. After the 
harvest period the Scheme have calculated each tenant's revenue 
(net of the value of services they have received during the year); 
this process has normally taken approximately six weeks. The 
Scheme then pay the tenants the remainer of their net income. 
y 
Although.padd^r production is now largely centralised in 
/ 
one compact„jarea, the present marketing system and its cost 
structure is identical to that used for marketing crops grown 
by individual producers scattered over wide areas. The actual 
cost structure of paddy marketing in recent years is shown in 
Table 3. The opening of the Mwea Rice Mill ltd on the Irrigati 
Scheme and its possible extension in 1970 to accommodate the 
whole of the rice paddy crop from Mwea/Tobere, provides an ideal 
opportunity for re-examining the whole of the marketing 
arrangements for the crop, in order to make the marketing system 
as efficient as possible. One method of achieving this is 
described in the following section. 
The Initial Stages of Marketing 
Under the present marketing system, the Mwea Irrigation 
Scheme charge the tenants 1.33s* per bag for performing the tas 
in the initial stages of marketing. This is adequate to cover t 
cost of these services. They then receive an Agency fee of 1.50 
per bag from the Maize and Produce Board.for acting as the Board 
agents in bulking the crop - this is the same fee which is paid 
to all the Board's agents. Thus on the 300,000 bag crop expecte 
in 1968/9, the Mwea Irrigation Scheme will collect, in total, 
£42,500 for providing initial marketing services of which a 
considerable proportion is a surplus which will be used to meet 
other expenses of the National Irrigation Board, Thus an 
immediate saving of 1,50s, per bag of paddy could be made by 
removing the agency fee paid by the Marketing Board to the 
National Irrigation Board, Another saving could be made by 
instituting a bag hiring scheme for paddy. At present new bags 
are used each year for paddy harvested from'the Mwea/Tebere 
Irrigation Scheme. In 1968/9 these will cost £45,000. The Mais 
and Produce Board will not recirculate used bags, and they arc 
not really suitable for milled rice which being a human foodstuf 
should be packed in clean bags, although it is reported that mil 
other than' the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd. do use used paddy bags for 
rice. Thus apart from a limited quantity of bags which are used 
for by-products, most of the 160,000 paddy bags entering Mwea 
Rice Mill in 1969 will have to be sold for approximately 1.20s, 
each, giving the mill aQ"loss" of 1.80s. per bag of paddy or 
£14,400 per annum which/recouped eventually from the consumer. 
If the Mwea Irrigation Scheme operated a bag hiring 
service, it is estimated that the average length of life of a 
-bag under these conditions would be three years* This should 
reauce the entire annual cost of- sacks to £15,000 with a strong 
possibility that with prudent management the cost could be reduci 
still further. Thus even allowing for depreciation of a store 
and administration, etc., the cost need be no more than 1.15s. 
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per bag of paddy harvested. 
The development of milling facilities at Mwea has led 
to a marked change in the transport requirements for paddy. 
In the years immediately prior to the Mv/ea Rice Mill being 
erected, all paddy was allocated to rice mills at Thika, 
Nairobi and Mombasa. It was therefore logical to store all 
paddy at Sagana, 16 miles from the Scheme where there are direct 
road and rail links with these mills. With the advent of the 
Mwea Rice Mill at Wanguru, new Jaddy stores were built on the 
Mwea/Tebere scheme at Nguka and at the mill. These two stores 
hold sufficient paddy to supply the existing mill capacity in th 
nine months after harvestrpaddy being delivered directly to the 
mill from the Thiba reception centre during harvest. The Maize 
and Produce Board currently deliver paddy to the Mwea Mil from 
the Nguka store for 45 cents per bag. As the mileage from the 
reception centres to the stores at Wanguru and Nguka is no 
greater than the distance between Nguka and Wanguru, a reasonabl 
charge for delivering paddy from the reception centres to the 
stores would seem to be 45 cents per lb.. 
The Mwea Mill is currently charged 1.20s. per lb. bag fo 
transporting rice from the null to Sagana. Thus a charge of 90 
cents per bag of paddy would seem reasonable for paddy moved 
from the Scheme reception centres to the Sagana store. Paddy 
to be insured during storage mainly against fire and theft. As 
on average, paddy is stored for about five months a cost of 
30 cents per bag (1 per cent of purchased value) for insurance 
would seem more than adequate,, 
A charge of 90 cents per bag is currently made for 
unloading and store handling. It is not known if this is a 
realistic charge, but if this is accepted as reasonable one ccul 
expect rice paddy to delivered to the Mwea Mill for 38sl5 per 
bag, and could be sold ex-store Sagana to other mills for 33s?5^ 
Until recently, the Maize and Produce Board allocated 
paddy to all mills at 53s. per bag. The Mwea Rice Mill Ltd have 
recently negotiated an allocation price of 46s. per bag for padd 
which they mill whilst other millers are still apparently paying 
53s. per bag. These prices compare markedly with the cost 
structure which could be attained if the proposals discussed 
above were a,dopted. A large proportion of the gap between the 
proposed allocation prices and the existing ones is explained 
by other charges which are made on the paddy marketing system, 
and these are discussed in the next sections 
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Marketing Board Overheads 
Marketing Boards allocate their overheads to different 
crops in proportion to the number of bags of the crop handled 
relative to the total number of bags handled. The Maize and 
Produce Board have separate accounts for paddy from Mwea and that 
from other areas. Apportioned overheads for Mwea paddy have risen 
steeply over the past few years until in 1966/7 they were 
equivalent to 3.44s. per bag of paddy, (£32,000) whereas in 
1964/5 they were only 2.7s. per bag and•were as low as 1.85s. 
per bag in 1962/3 (Table 3). If similar functions were performed 
for each crop this system of allocating overheads would be 
perfectly reasonable. It is however questionable whether this 
system is fair when so little administration is required to 
handle the Mwea rice paddy - their main task seems to be to look 
after the paddy in two of the stores and to arrange transport as 
it is required for the mill. Their other function is to provide 
credit facilities, it has been estimated that this can cost no 
more £13,000 per annum. • 
. Rearranging the crop finance arrangements could eliminate 
this cost. . There might be a good cr.se for eliminating the Maize 
and Produce Board entirely from the paddy marketing operation and 
thus effecting a saving in the region of £30,000 per annum. They 
do however provide specialist services in fumigation, stacking 
bags etc.,' but even these do not justify the current overhead 
charge made against rice paddy from the Mwea scheme. 
The Rice Paddy Stabilisation Fund 
In the early years of the Mwea Irrigation Scheme, 
difficulties were experienced in selling paddy to the millers as 
they were accustomed to receiving their supplies from Tanzania. 
In both 1959/60 and 1960/61 Tanzanian paddy was available at very 
low prices and rice paddy from the Mwea scheme was sold at a lower 
price than the purchase price (including all agency fees) and 
a Government subsidy totalling £40,807 was given to the Marketing 
Board to balance the difference. 
Apparently, soon after this the Government reduced the 
'intervention price' for paddy to 17 cents per lb. As a 
proportion of the paddy at this time was sold to millers by auction 
there was a possibility that the price of paddy could fluctuate 
annually and provisions for price stabilisation were probably 
oonsidered desirable. • However, the auction system only lasted 
about one year, and since-then the Marketing Board have been 
able to sell all of the paddy at a fixed price to the mills, thi 
price easily covering all their costs. Therefore ever since 
1960, there has been no need for a stabilisation fund and yet 
since that date £380,251 has been accumulated. Of this total, 
the Ministry of Agriculture (in whose name the fund is held) has 
allocated £205,000 since July 1966 to the National Irrigation 
Board to establish a depreciation fund for the inov g a ble assets 
of the Mwea Irrigation Scheme, 
The presence of this fund has acted, in effect, as a tax 
on consumers because under the cost-plus pricing system which 
operates, the cost of the fund have been passed on to the mills 
and thence on to the consumers. The 1966/7 contribution to the 
fund was equivalent to almost 6,8 cents per lb. of rice. Given 
that the demand for rice by Africans is extremely price elastic, 
and that the possibility of Kenyan rice production exceeding 
local demand at current prices has been foreseen for some years, 
it is difficult to see why this fund has been kept in existence 
for so long, unless this is considered an appropriate method of 
raising development funds." 
If this is the express purpose of the fund, it would seer 
more honest to call it a Development Fund, and to state-whether 
it is to be used only for the development of the Mwea Irrigation 
Scheme, for irrigation schemes in general (including schemes for 
onion and cotton growing), for improvements in rice marketing, 
or for general development purposes. It would then be easier oc 
assess whether the present incidence of the consumer tax is the 
appropriat e one. 
If the intended purpose of the fund is still that of 
stabilisation, it might be argu ed on equity grounds that the 
money remaining in the fund should be distributed to consumers 
in the form of a subsidy on rice. However, as other methods are 
proposed for- reducing consumer prices, it is suggested that this 
sum should be made available to the National Irrigation Board or 
the Mwea Irrigation Scheme ever the next 5 years for improving 
the rice marketing from the Mwea Irrigation Scheme. Some 
specific pfept>sals._axe "consumer education on the nutritive value 
of parboiled rice, the financing of a sack hiring scheme, provi-
ding a fund for crop finance—purposes and-providing -extensi-cn-s 
to the Mwea Rice Mill. \ 
It has also been suggested- that there is an urgent need 
for the establishment of a Disaster Fund, as the Mwea Irrigation 
Scheme is extremely vulnerable to a variety of natural hazards, 
locust invasion being the most dangerous and topical one. 
The rapid spread of a plant virus disease would create a simila 
devastating effect. 
Rice Paddy Marketing - Summary. 
The present time is a transition period in the marketin 
of rice paddy, for by the early 1970's it is planned that all 
paddy grown on the Mwea/Tebere Irrigation Scheme will be milled 
by Mwea Rice Mill Ltd, However, even at the present time it is 
patently obvious that the allocation price of paddy to mills 
could be reduced drastically. 
One may question the value of the Maize and Produce 
Board in the marketing process as many of the marketing 
function are performed by the Mwea Irrigation Scheme, Indeed 
there is a good case for suggesting that the Mwea Irrigation 
Scheme management, should be made entirely responsible for the 
marketing of Mwea paddy, hiring specialist services from the 
Maize and Produce Board when required. 
If it is Government policy to make the paddy marketing 
system as efficient as possible, perhaps the best method would 
be to raise the gross producer price to 24 cents per lb, of 
paddy (38.40s. per bag) and make this also the allocation price 
to the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd and for sale ex-store Sagana for otho: 
mills. The Mwea Irrigation Scheme would then have to deduct tlx 
costs of its marketing operations from the gross producer price 
and would seemingly have every incentive to keep its costs as 
low as possible in order to keep producer's revenue at its 
present level. 
Rice Paddy Milling 
Mwea Rice Mill Ltd 
Mwea Rice Mill Ltd is jointly owned by the National 
Irrigation Board and tenants of the Mwea/Tebere Irrigation 
Scheme through their credit co-operative, 60 per cent of the 
equity capital is provided by the National Irrigation Board, 40 
per cent by the tenants. The first phase of the mill involved 
a total capital expenditure of £175,000 on roads, building and 
equipment. The equipment consists of two parallel mills and a 
parboiling plant. The mill has been in operation since January 
1968 and the mill manager has had to train all mill hands and 
the plant into full service. The manufacture of parboiled rice 
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is expected to start in early 1969. The mill should then be 
.working virtually at capacity-, that is for 285 days per annum 
at 14 hours per day worked in two continuous shifts. When this 
stage is reached the mill will be processing11,500 tons of r.ie-
paddy per annum, 
Although the mill has been working for a relatively 
short time, it is possible to build a tentative estimate of 
its total annual costs, (Table 5). 
At the moment there is some uncertainty concerning the 
extra operating costs associated with parboiling, and thus these 
estimates may have to be changed when the operating costs of the 
parboiling plant are known. In addition to the fixed and 
operating costs a return of 20 per cent per annum on invested 
capital has been allowed in the calculations. 
It may be argued that one is not justified in selecting 
a suitable rate of return in such an arbitrary_ manner, but it is 
considered better than being accused of forgetting to allow a 
return on capital invested. However, it does raise the wide 
issue of the rate of return to be allowed to quasimonopolistic 
organisations who are price makers in the domestic market* 
The value of by-products, estimated at £5,000 per annum-
is not shown in the calculations. If they were included the 
surplus before taxation would amount to £40,000 per annum which 
would allow a divided of 13*7 per cent to be paid to the 
shareholders after corporate.taxation at 40 per cent, This 
would seem a generous return for such a safe investment0 Every 
5 percentage points reduction in the gross divided will reducc 
milling costs by 2.28s. per bag of rice, or just over 1 cent pcr-
ib. 
If this estimate of the cost structure is realistic and 
if the present ex-mill price of rice is left unaltered, Mwea « 
Rice Mill Ltd can be expected to make a profit before tax of. 
around £120,000 with a full years operations, that is, a-return 
on capital invested (before tax) of over 70 per cent. i 
t • \ ' • 
\ ' i 
I \ • • i s I | i \ 
TABLE 5; Estimated Annual Costs of First Phase of the Mwea Rice Mi 
Ltd. 
Operating Costs £K per annum 
•V ages 
Electricity 
Fuel for parboiling 
Water filtration 
Ash and husk disposal 
Maintenance 
Coat of bags at 3.05s, 
Total operating costs 
each 
10,500 
5, 545 
2,245 
150 
1,000 
2,000 
11,700 
33,140 
0\7erhead costs 
Depreciation 
Interest on capital borrowed 
Insurance 
Administration (Nat. Irrig. Board) 
Directors fees 
Audit 
Travelling 
Use of Land Rover 
Sundries 
Total overhead costs 
Total costs 
20 per cent return on capital 
20,000 
3,900 
1,950 
3,500 
800 
400 
780 
600 
4,500 
35,930 
69,070 
35,000 
104,070 
It is envisaged that when fully operational one of the mills 
will be used for producing white milled rice, the other milling 
parboiled rice* Assuming that 6,000 tons of paddy are milled for 
white rice and 5,500 tons for parboiled rice and with an extraction 
rate of 63 per cent on white rice milling but of 68 per cent on 
parboiled rice,.ipn average one may expect ohe 220 lb, bag of rice 
from 2,10 x 160 ^b, bags of paddy. Thus the average cost of a bag 
of rice ex-mill MV/ea • (including bag) should be as follows 
Rice paddy 2.10 x 38.40s. 
Cost of milling 20 x 104,070 z 2.10 
/ i6o;ooo 
s . c . 
80 64 
27 32 
107 This is equivalent to 49.07 cents per lb ex-mill Mwea. 96 
Transport into Nairobi should cost no more than 1,80s. per 
bag of rice, or 0.82 cents per lb. bringing the ex-store Nairobi 
price to 49.9 cents per lb. 
Even if we then allow an extremely generous 30 per cent 
mark up for bulk breaking, packaging, wholesaling and retailing 
we arrive at a retail price of just under 65 cents per lb. 
Thus it appears feasible to reduce the average retail price of 
rice in Nairobi to 65 cents per lb. with no reduction in producer-
price and allowing an ample retail margin and a generous return on 
capital invested. As the average retail price of local rice in 
Nairobi in the first 8 months of 1968 was 85 cents per lb. a 
price of 65 cents represents a price reduction of over 23 per cent• 
Rice at this price would be cheaper than bread and might provide 
an attractive dietary alternative for middle and lower income 
consumers. 
The price of rice could be further reduced by reducing the 
price the producer receives for paddy - every 1 cent per lb. 
reduction in paddy price reduces the price of rice by almost 
1.6 cents per lb. 
Because of the extra operations involved in parboiled rice 
production relative to white milled rice production, it is 
apparent that the parboiled product will be more expensive to 
produce. However as' parboiled rice is a nutritionally superior-
product to white milled rice (Appendix I:), it would be advantageous 
on social grounds to introduce it to as wide a range of the 
population as possible. For this reason there are strong grounds 
for keeping the price of parboiled rice as low as is economically 
possible at least until the product has had a chance of being 
accepted by the general public. This can be done by sharing as 
many costs as possible bet ween white milled and parboiled rice.-
that is, allowing white milled rice to subsidise parboiled rice. 
Once parboiled rice is established, the price differential 
between it and white milled rice could be widened to reflect the 
real costs of producing each type of rice. One could then expect 
white milled rice to be sold in Nairobi at well below 65 cents per 
lb. and even parboiled rice to be sold at well below the current 
retail price for white milled rice. 
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Extension of the Mwea Rice Mill. 
When the first phase of the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd was build, 
there was already sufficient capacity within Kenya to deal with 
the whole of the crop, 2he main justifications for building the 
Mwea Rice Mill were first, the saving in transport costs in not 
sending paddy from Mwea to the Coast. Secondly, none of the 
existing mills is equipped to produce parboiled rice which is 
nutritionally superior to white milled rice. Third, although 
there was already existing excess capacity in the milling 
industry, (and the mills at Thika, Nairobi were built in 1961/2 
with Government approval to handle the Mwea crop, it was considered 
to be in the long term interests of the industry to rationalise 
the milling sector. Additionally, after seeing the handsome 
profits being made by the existing mills (even working at below 
30 per cent capacity) it was considered that a mill on the Mwea 
Scheme would be a useful method of increasing the income of 
Mwea tenants. 
It is now envisaged that the mill at Mwea will be extended to 
a capacity of 25,000 tons paddy per annum in the early 1970*s, 
that is it will be capable of handling all of the paddy produced 
at Mwea. This will put the mill in an extremely dominant 
position, as the only supplies available for other millers will 
be from Nyanza rain grown rice, the Ahero Pilot Project Irrigation 
Scheme, and the Yala Swamp Reclaimation Project. It could be that 
the existing rice mills will mill the paddy from these schemes, 
but following the success of the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd., these 
schemes may wish to establish their own mills. This is a 
problem which will have to be resolved in the near future as 
production of paddy at Ahero will start shortly. 
The benefits of allowing the extension to the'Mwea Rice 
Mill Ltd is that given the existing standards of management, one 
can expect" a further lowering of rice milling costs. This will 
derive from three sources. First, the anticipated capital costs 
of the extension are £150,000 to provide extra capacity of 13,500 
tons of paddy per annum. Because of the high capital costs of 
the parboiling plant, the first phase cost £170,000-for a capacity 
of only 11,500 tons. It is hoped that much of the finance for 
the extension will derive, from long term foreign capital loans at 
low rates of interest, so the interest charges and annual 
repayments will be relatively low. Second, one can expect a 
further lowering of rice milling costs leading from a spreading 
of overheads and ability to increase labour productivity. Thirc 
there will be further savings from not transporting paddy from 
Mwea/Tebere to Thika and. Nairobi. Thus one might hopefully 
anticipate that retail price of local rice could be even lower th 
65 cents per lb. when the second phase of the Mwea Rice Mill is 
brought into operation. However, if the standard of management 
at Mwea Rice Mill Ltd. were to deteriorate, or if there was no 
effective cost control we would find the price of rice rising 
again. In this respect it would have been beneficial to allow 
the mills at Thika and Nairobi to remain in existence and to 
compete for paddy supplies, and also to compete for a place in 
the retail market. Even under this system one might have 
experienced collusion between all three mills to raise the 
ex-mill price . 
To guard against any possibility of cost inflation through 
inefficiency of lack of competition, it seems imperative to 
derive methods of protecting the consumers interest when the 
Mwea extension commences operations. 
In the past millers of rice have been responsible for their 
own marketing, selling either through agents of wholesalers. 
Apparently when most of Kenya's rice requirements were imported, 
the trade was dominated by a handful of importers but we have beer 
told that their grip has loosened as imports become a smaller 
proportion of total availability. This might explain the reductic 
in the mark up on imported rice in the period 1961-65. When the 
Mwea Rice Mill Ltd started operations it was decided that the 
Maize and Produce Board would sell their rice for them, presumably 
either on a commission basis or an agency fee basis. 
At the moment the retail price of rice is controlled by the 
Government at the following prices 
Although the ex-mill price is officially fixed, the Maize 
Produce Board have to sell at the best price which retailers are 
willing to offer, bearing in mind that the market has to be 
cleared. At the moment. (November, 1968) they are paying Mwea 
Rice Mill .Ltd .iJxe following prices.;- — 
The Marketing of Rice 
Supo r 
Grade I 
Grade II 
All other grades 
90 cents per lb 
85 cents per lb 
80 cents per lb 
55 cents per lb 
io Mark up to official price. 
Super 157/50 per bag 71.6 cents per lb. 25.7 
Grade '1 147/50 67.0 26.9 
Grade II 137/- 62.3 28.4 
Brokens 87/- 39.5 39.2 
for rice (ex-store Sagana or ex-mill Mwea.) If the controlled 
prices were adhered to the wholesale and retail mark ups would 
appear reasonable (although they are slightly larger than the 
percentages shown as the retailer retains the bag which can be 
resold). However, there is ample evidence that price control is 
being evaded through the lack of effective implementation of the 
grading scheme. 
The grading scheme at present in force is based solel 
on one characteristic, namely the percentage of broken grains in 
a given sample of rice. The actual grade boundaries are set ats 
Super<5 per cent broken grains by weight 
Grade 1 5 per cent anddO per cent broken grains by 
weight 
Grade 11 10 per cent and<20 per cent broken grains by 
weight 
'Brokens® 20 per cent and more broken grains by weigh 
Broken grains are selected as a grading charaeteristi 
because ther presence results in 'free' starch in the cooking 
process and increases the possibility of coagulation between 
grains - producing the undesir.ed 'stodgy' effect. However, the 
present grading scheme ignore^' eaually important aspects such 
as the presence of dirt or impurities in the sample, and the 
presence of loose starch dust on the grains which can cause 
coagulation in cooking even in the absence of broken grains. 
Not only is the present grading system too limited in 
its criteria but it also encourages open abuse of the existing 
price control. At the moment there is a tremendous temptation 
for wholesalers and/or retailers to buy Grade II rice at 137/-
per bag and sell it as Super rice at 90 cents per lb. thereby 
enjoying a gross mark up of 44 per cent on the purchased pricee 
Retailers probably regularly engage in.this practice as the 
chances of being:'caught' by the Government inspectorate are 
extremely siaail and few consumers are sufficiently aware of the 
gr&ding criteria to know that they have been misled in their 
purchases. This situation will be aggravated with the presence 
of Grade jj Mwea rice ojx the market because in terms of cleanlir. 
and freedom from dust it is equal to the Super grade and the 
possibilities of misrepresentation become even greater. 
This leads one to question the value of a grading 
scheme in its present form. Seen from a consumers point of 
view the chief value of a grading scheme lies in the enhanced 
ability of the consumer to purchase a product with the 
characteristics he or she desires. Prom a producers point of 
view the value lies in the opportunity to divide a single but 
heterogenous market into several sub-markets in order to exploit 
the varying demand conditions which exist. It is hoped thereby 
to expand overall/ demand for the product by meeting consumer-
satisfaction more; precisely and/or to increase revenue by 
"charging what thje market will bear". 
In this case it appears that the existing grading 
scheme is giving rise to a situation diametrically opposed to its 
original intention. It does not benefit consumers, first as it is 
debatable whether the percentage of broken grains alone in a 
sample makes a sufficient difference to cooking quality; second, 
because the characteristics of rice not covered by the grading 
scheme, namely cleanliness, freedom from dirt and dust etc. are 
of equal or greater importance to these included in the scheme; 
and third, because the consumer in her ignorance is having to 
pay an inflated price for an 'inferior® product. 
It is also doubtful if the millers benefit from the 
scheme. At the moment, with the arbitrary 10s. per bag differential 
between grades, one is faced with the ludicrous position that the 
Mwea Rice Mill ltd and the Maize and Produce Board, their selling 
agents, find it impossible to sell Super grade rice and are 
therefore producing only Grade II rice although Super grade rice 
could bp produced almost as easily. 
! 1 | 
This, of course, arises because the wholesale and 
retail trade are aware of the ineffectiveness of the implementation 
of Grade standards. In this case it would seem to be in the 
producers and consumers interests either to scrap the existing 
standards and.sell rice of a f.a.q. or g.a.q. standard only, or 
to thoroughly revise the gradihg system and place it on a broader-
basis and ensure that it is implemented. 
\ 
\ 
Another major problem at the moment is that rice is 
not being 'marketed' it is simply being sold. For instance, rice 
produced by the mill at Mwea is undoubtedly of superior quality 
(less dust and broken grains) than that from other mills. i 
Howeyer, there is no way of distinguishing this rice at the ret&j" 
level. Nor is there any incentive to differentiate it given 
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controlled prices, because to pack the rice in say 1 lb. 
polythene bags would probably cost in total up to 20 cents 
per lb. Any scheme less elaborate than this, e.g. using ordinary 
paper bags stamped "Mwea Rice Mills Ltd." would probably be cb;/i.-... • 
traders printing their own supplies of bags and filling them v.iti-
rice from other sources. 
Unless some method is found of distinguishing between 
well-milled and poorly milled rice, Kenyan grown rice in general 
will be branded as being of poor quality. One alternative to 
branding might be to improve the Government inspectorate and to 
introduce more rigorous standards for rice quality. 
Rice Marketing in the Future. 
The problem of controlled prices is only one of several 
which needs to be discussed in the context of future rice 
marketing when the Mwea Rice Mill is the dominant rice miller. 
If prices are controlled one of two things may occur. 
If the price is set too low it will be disregarded - retailers will 
argue that it is not worth stocking rice at this price. If the 
price is set too high there will be a tendency to use the 
controlled price as a minimum price. 
Under normal conditions the retail trade in Kenya is 
extremely competitive - most 'price ramps' have been perpetrated 
by importers and wholesalers, and not by retailers. Thus one 
might expect that in the absence of price control and in the 
presence of an effective grading scheme (or failing this, in the 
absence of a grading scheme), the retailers profit margin would 
tend to a normal level. 
What will happen with the removal of price control 
assuming that producers receive a gross guaranteed price identical 
to the allocation price of paddy to the mills and the present 
restriction of imports remains? Initially, at the feasible retail 
price of 65 cents per lb., demand is likely to exceed supply and 
market prices will rise. Given the structure of the industry the 
increase in revenue should accrue to the mills, or after 1970, to 
Mwea Rice Mill Ltd alone. In the latter case, if we assume that 
profits were increased by the amount of the revenue increase and 
that a flat rate corporation tax of 40 per cent applies, then we 
would find the price increase split eventually in the ratio 40 ; 
36 : 24 between the Goverment, the National Irrigation Board ar.d 
tenants or the Mwea/Tebere Scheme who are shareholders in Mvna 
Rice Mill ltd. 
There are two methods by which any tendency for the 
Mwea Rice Mill Ltd to exploit its monopoly powers can be checked. 
The first would be to prevent the exports or transfer of Kenyan 
rice to any country at a price below the ex-mill price charged to 
domestic consumers. (A monopolist, would .export rice providing infinitely elastic 
the price he received in the/export market exceeded the marginal 
revenue obtained in the domestic market). The other method 
would be to construct a mechanism whereby imports of rice would 
be allowed if the ex-mill price of rice rose above the import 
parity price of rice of a similar quality. 
C-iven this safeguard price controls for rice could be 
abolished. As the Mwea Rice Mill Ltd will have a dominant share 
of the market its selling agents (the Maize and Produce Board) 
will be the effective price setters in the domestic market. 
Price ramps would then best be avoided if the Maize and Produce 
Board advertised their weekly selling price for rice. 
Long Term Market Prospects for Kenya Rice. 
With Kenya now being virtually self-sufficient in rice>-
if the declining trend in rice consumption of the Asian population 
is to be held or reversed clearly the quality of the milling 
process will have to be improved and possibly the quality of the 
paddy as well. The introduction of parboiled rice from the Kv-ca 
Mill may be a significant factor here. However, future production 
plans for Mwea-Tebere and schemes at Ahero and the Yala Swamps 
show that by 1972 when the Mwea-Tebere Scheme will have reached 
its limit of 25000 tons of paddy produced per annum plus say 5000 
tons of paddy from irrigation pilot schemes and the rain grown 
crop in Nyanza, the Kenyan annual output of paddy may be 30,000 
tons or 18,900 tons of rice. And production will be increasing. 
Even if the Asians increase their rice consumption to say 120 lbs 
per head with the Arabs and Europeans maintaining former-
consumption levels, there will be a surplus of 8200 tons which 
will either.have to be consumed by Kenyan Africans, mostly in 
urban areas, or exported^ With an estimated 800,000 Africans 
in the main urban areas by 1972, 8200 tons of rice represents 
a per capita consumption of about 23 lbs compared with a current 
consumption estimated is being about 10. lbs, 1 1 an annual 
increase of about 20$. 
Now in parts of West Africa rice consumption is ;about 
15 kilos per capita and therefore a consumption of 23 lbs per capi ^ 
in Kenya is feasible but thought to be unlikely. There is a 
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tradition of rice consumption in West Africa, Ghana particularly, 
which does not exist in East Africa. Even a drastic reduction 
in the retail price of rice is unlikely to cause this degree of 
substitution between cereals by the urban African consumer 
although, it must be admitted, no allowances have been made in 
these estimates for rice consumption by rural Africans, 
Failing a reduction in price, an annual increase in per 
capita consumption of about 20 fa, even with the reported 
relatively high elasticity of demand with respect to income of 12 
0,8 to 1,0 , bespeaks of an annual increment in per capita 
income which even the most optimistic planner would not forecast. 
Even with the recommended reduction in retail price, it is highly 
probable on present production trends that Kenya may become a 
regular exporter of rice. 
With a world market price for top-grade rice of about 
£90 per ton f.o.b. Thailand in May 1968, Kenya producers should 
have no difficulty in competing in the world market providing 
that Kenya Sindino rice is acceptable both as to the quality of 
the raw paddy (will it be too 'chalky' for the basumati-spoiled 1 t3 
palate or will it be just right for the chopstick market?) ' and 
the quality of processing. Both of these factors are under the 
control of the Kdnyan rice industry to a greater or lesser degree, 
as are the means by which marketing costs to the port of loading 
are kept to a minimum. But there is one vital factor which faces 
all small exporters - as Kenya is - in a.very large world market 
which they cannot control: falling world prices. Recent research 
in rice genetics and husbandry has revealed the very real 
possibility of a transformation in the world rice situation 
where traditional rice importers may become self-sufficient in 
the cereal within the next few years. Such a transformation has 
the inevitable concomitant of a decline in trade in rice and 
market prices. While this prospective situation undoubtedly is 
to be welcomed from the consumasE view point, from the point of — „ -F + c -1 KI RIlTlTllv 
, nmrv, source: Statistical Abstracts 
MEPD, 1967. 
3. Massell, Benton P. and Heyer, J. May 1967. Household 
Expenditure in Nairobi: a Statistical Analysis of Consume 
Behaviour. Occasional Paper No. 2 Institute for Develop;. 
Studies, Nairobi. 
4. Massell, Benton P. (1968) Determinants of Household 
Expenditure in Rural Kenya, Food Research' Institure, 
Stanford University. 
5. . Source, Statistical Abstracts, MEPD, 1958-1967. 
6. FAO (1965) op. cit. Also FAO (1967) Agricultural 
Commodities-Projections for 1975 and 1985. 
7. Source, Statistical Abstracts, MEPD, 1958 - 1967. 
8. FAO (1965) op. cit. 
9. Alternatively it could have been caused by a reduction in 
import quotas 
10. Defined simpJLy. as. maximising (our subjective valuation • of) 
consumers satisfaction at minimum cost, with-the proviso 
in this case, of not making producers any worse off than 
they are at present. • 
11. 'It is suggested that the estimated urban African consumption 
of rice in 1966 at about 16 lbs per capita was an exception 
caused by the peculiar market conditions of that drought-
affected time. 
12. Massell, Benton F. and Heyer, J. (1967) op. cit. 
M r=i 
P 
EH CO Pt c o 
P4 
pq - j 
& o 
o 
CM 
co 
' 1 
(  
> 
H 
EH M 
EH e 
a 
M H e @ PM Pi <3 
o o H 
Pi 0 ft 
o d 
g ct •H H r^-l EH 
0 PH 
d o 
p d P=i 
0 P 
o Pi PH 
o o 
•3 o 
LO 
fO 
H 
to « 
© 
CM 
CM 
• 
tO H 
O 
l o t<*\ 
to 
vo O 
CM 
CVJ 
fO 
00 
CTi 
C7\ •sj-
to 
CO Uj 
I to r-t eg 
o 
to 
o 
cr\ o • • H H 
O Ch H 
H 
O H • • CO 
O CTi ir\ LO CM to 
CM 0 H 0 iH P •H o rQ 
F4 
d 0 ft FQ Pi 
CTl 
O 
C-
VO 
o 
VO to 
0 p •H 
i 
t3 0 H H 
t 
0 0 U O 
•H -H P5 
H 
O 
to 
CM 
to 
lO « 
<T\ 
VO 
LO to 
Pi o 
g 
0 p •rl 
i 
M d 0 
0 N •H d 
I H O 
si 
o 
o CO CM oo LO 00 
t o H CM o o 
• • • m « 
o o o o o o 
H <H 
VO 
00 
to 
CT> to 
CQ 0 •rl 
fH 
0 
02 
P 0 H 
I 
Cl O o 
JS 
EH 
LO 
VO en H 
o 
0 o Pi 
o 
CO 
o vo cn H 
O 
CQ 
3 o 
•rl o o o 
Si 0 o Pi o d 0 03 a 0 0 PI O •rl H « d o •rl c d 0 
a CQ 
•rl 
d (Ti C\J ci> 
* 
C O 0 S 0 
•H 03 0 0 •H pq Pi 0 03 CQ ft •rl P Si Pi 03 o fl ft O 0 •H Pi P d H 
rt- 0$ 0 •H Pi O 0 o ft •H w S o • c> 
CQ 
o o PH 
<H o 
a o •rl P •rl 
03 o ft § 
o « 
CM 
